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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOHI~~RT LEE JONES, 
Plaint4f and Respondent, 
-vs.-
('L.\UDIUS D. KNUTSON and Gase No. 10163 
~ALT LAKE CITY LINES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEI\IENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks damages 
for pPrsonal injuries suffered by him when the automo-
bile which he was driving was struck in the rear by a bus 
owned by defendant Salt Lake City Lines and driven by 
defendant Claudius D. Knutson. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWE,R COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks only that this Court affirm the 
judgment of the Trial Court. 
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STATE~MENT OF FACTS 
On November 2, 1961, the plaintiff, Robert Lee 
Jones, was injured when the automobile he was driving 
was struck in the rear by a bus owned by the defendant 
Salt Lake City Lines, and driven by defendant Claudius 
D. Knutson. The accident occurred between 11th and 
12th East, on 9th South, in Salt Lake City. At this point 
on 9th South, the street is 61 feet 10 inches wide (R. 131), 
and is divided into 4 lanes, 2 eastbound and 2 westbound 
(R. 124). The eastbound lanes are divided from the west-
bound lanes by two yellow lines · ( R. 133), and the west-
bound lanes are divided by a white line (R. 145). The 
inside westbound lane is 11 feet wide, and the outside 
westbound lane is 19 feet 8 inches wide (R. 133). The 
road surface at the scene of the accident is black top 
asphalt (R. 131). Between 11th and 12th East, a distance 
of 690 feet (R. 132), 9th South has a very steep slope 
(R. 124). !The hill starts at 12th East and ends at 11th 
East (R. 143). At the time of the accident the weather 
was clear and the street was dry (R. 124). The point of 
impact was in the outside westbound lane 287 feet 2 
inches east of the east curb line of 11th East (R. 131). 
Immediately prior to the accident, plaintiff, and a 
passenger, were driving along 13th East in Salt Lake 
City. At the intersection of 13th East and 9th South he 
turned west and proceeded down 9th South in the out-
side lane of traffic (R. 144). As he proceeded down 9th 
South he observed a car pull on to 9th South from the 
vicinity of East High School (R .. 144). The car pulled into 
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tlw out~idP \\'P~t hound lane, and plaintiff followed it 
down thP hill. (R. 1-t-t). As the car pulled in front of 
plaintiff, he noticed soine objects on top of the car. 
Tht>~P ohjt>eb; later turned out to be a pair of shoes 
(I L 1-t;->). rrlH· shoes fell fr01n the top of the car after it 
ln\tl pa~~(·d 12th East going west on 9th South (R. 145). 
Tht> ear then pulled over to the curb, and the driver, a 
"·nnmn, wPnt out in the street to pick up the shoes 
( 1\. 1-+3). In order to avoid hitting the woman, plaintiff 
g-avP a hand signal and stopped (R,. 145, 174). Prior 
to his stop he looked through his rear window for ve-
hicles and there were none behind him (R. 17 4, 175). He 
~toppPd with his two left wheels one or two feet to the 
lPft of the line dividing the two westbound lanes (R. 145). 
\YhilP stopped he opened his door and picked up a shoe 
from the street (R. 145). He then rolled gradually for-
ward (R. 17 -±) at a speed of not more than 2 or 3 miles 
per hour to a point alongside the other car (R. 146). When 
alongside the other car he handed the shoe to his passen-
ger, who was handing it to the other driver when plain-
tiff heard two or three beeps on a horn, turned his head, 
and was hit by the bus (R. 146). The impact knocked 
plaintiff's car 67 feet forward (R. 131). During the slow 
move forward he had his foot on the brake. He did not 
make any turns, did not change lanes, and made no fur-
ther hand signals. Plaintiff did not see the bus at any 
time until a moment before impact (R. 149). Plaintiff's 
tail lights were working and could be seen by the bus 
driver from the time he first stopped, until the time of 
impact (R. 189, 191). One and one-half minutes elapsed 
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between the time that plaintiff stopped to pick up the 
shoe and the moment of impact (R. 138, 147). Plaintiff's 
car was motionless for approximately 30 seconds while 
stopped next to the other car (R. 147). At the time of 
the impact, plaintiff's car was in drive gear, the brakes 
were on, and the taillights were working (R. 148). Pic-
tures of the scene of the accident were admitted in evi-
dence as exhibits 15 (R. 150, 151), 16 (R. 151, 152) 17 
(R. 152) 18 (R,. 152) and 19 (R. 152, 153). 
On the day of the accident defendant Knutson was 
driving a 35 passenger bus, 35 feet in length (R.180). The 
brakes were in good working order (R. 192). He was 
carrying 28 High School students (R. 181). He made a 
safety stop at 12th East and 9th South (R. 187). From 
that point a person could see all of 9th South from 12th 
East to 11th East (Exhibit 19, R. 152). Mr. Knutson 
testified that while he was stopped at 12th East he saw 
the Jones vehicle fully stopped, and the driver picking 
up something from the road (R. 187). He saw the Jones 
vehicle start to move forward at about the same time the 
bus started to move ( R. 190, 19'1), and as the Jones ve-
hicle moved down the hill its brake lights went on and off. 
(R. 189, 191). The bus brakes were applied all the way 
down the hill from 12th East (R. 188). 
Mr. Knutson also testified in response to his own 
counsel's direct examination: 
Q. Would you tell us what happened next¥ 
A. He made a stop. It wasn't a sudden stop, but 
it was an unexpected stop. And I pressed on 
the brakes, and seeing I couldn't stop sounded 
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mv horn and looked to my left, and there was 
a ~·ar cmning along the left, so I couldn't pull 
on arouiHl, and I couldn't quite stop in time 
and bu1nped in the back of his car. (R. 188) 
(Italics added) 
(~. All right. When you first became aware of 
the fact that Mr. Jones was going to stop at 
the point where the collision took place, what 
called your attention to the fact that he was 
making a stop~ 
A. 'yell Inainly because he had stopped, because 
his lights were on and off coming down t~e 
hill. 
Q. The lights were what~ 
A. The brake lights were on and off coming down 
the hill. (R. 189) 
ARGUME,NT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DE-
FENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND RE-
FUSING DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
7. 
Defendant requested the following instruction be 
gi Yen to the jury : 
You are instructed that Utah law provides 
that no person shall stop or suddenly decrease the 
speed of a motor vehicle without first giving an 
appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle im-
nlediately to the rear when there is opportunity 
to giYe such signal. In this regard, the mere visi-
ble light showing the application of the brakes is 
not compliance with Utah law but the giving of an 
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appropriate signal in this regard would require 
the giving of a hand signal. 
Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff in 
this action stopped or suddenly decreased the 
speed of his vehicle without first giving a hand 
signal to the driver of the vehicle immediately to 
its rear and that plaintiff further had an oppor-
tunity to give such a signal, then you will find 
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
The court refused this instruction. After plaintiff's evi-
dence, defendants made a motion for a directed verdict, 
which was denied. After the verdict for plaintiff defend-
ants made a motion for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, which was also denied. 
The basic issue raised by these motions and the re-
quested instruction is that of the contributory negligence 
of the plaintiff. In denying these motions and refusing 
the instruction the trial court was following the policy 
of the Supreme Court of Utah, set forth in Webb vs. 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275,342 
P.2d 1094 (1959): 
"It is the declared policy of this court to 
zealously protect the right of trial by jury and 
not to take issues from them and rule as a matter 
of law except in clear cases." 
As is the case with the question of negligence, contri-
butory negligence is a question for the jury unless all 
reasonable men must draw the same conclusions from the 
facts as they are shown. Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304, (1955) ; JJ![ oore vs. 
Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676 (1945). See also Glenn 
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vs. Oibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013 
( lV:l-1-). Contributory negligence becomes a question of 
law wlH·n frmn the facts reasonable men can draw but one 
infereiH't', and that inference points unerringly to the 
negligeneP of the plaintiff as a contributing cause of 
his injury. Cox vs. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 
1047 ( 1953). If the court is in doubt whether reasonable 
men might arrive at different conclusions, then this very 
doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the 
jury and not one of law for the court. Webb vs. Olin 
:llathieson Chemical Corporation, supra. See also Y oshi-
taro Oku.dn vs. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P.2d 287 (1956). 
In order to be guilty of contributory negligence as a 
math>r of law the evidence must be undisputed, the facts 
must not be conflicting, and must clearly prove~ that one 
aeb:d in a 1nanner in which a reasonable prudent person 
would not have acted under the circumstances. Allison 
v~. JlcOarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 P.2d 870 (1944). Only 
in a e ll•ar case, where all reaso~able minds would agree, 
should the issue of contributory negligence be taken from 
tlw jury. Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. Depot Co., 120 
Ftah -1-3~3, :235 P.2d 515· (1951). In determining whether 
this plaintiff is contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law, the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom 
must be Yiewed in a light most favorable to him. Cox vs. 
Thompson, supra; Roach vs. Kyremes, 116 Utah 405, 
~11 P.:2d 181 (1949). 
~-\.t the pretrial (R. 15, 16) the defendants set forth 
their contention that the plaintiff was negligent in the 
following particulars: 
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1. In suddenly stopping his car in the path 
of the bus; 
2. In failing to keep a proper lookout to the 
rear when he could have seen, or should have seen 
defendants' bus was immediately behind; 
3. In failing to signal his intention to stop; 
and 
4. In carelessly and negligently changing 
from one traffic lane to another without giving 
a signal of his intention to do so immediately into 
the path of the bus. 
These same contentions were set forth in defendants' 
requested instruction No. 6 (R. 49), which was in fact 
given as the court's instruction No. 8 (R. 69). Therefore, 
if plaintiff had violated Sections 41-6-69' (c), 41-6-70, 
or 41-6-103, Utah Code Annotated (19'53), and made a 
sudden unexpected stop without a proper signal as con-
tended by defendants, the jury could have properly found 
him guilty of contributory negligence under that instruc-
tion. The evidence however, is quite to the contrary. 
Plaintiff stopped in order to avoid hittiing a woman in 
the road in front of him. At the time he stopped he 
gave a proper hand signal. At the time he stopped he 
looked through his rear window, and of course saw noth-
ing that would be dangerous, since the bus had not yet 
arrived at 12th East for its safety stop. Also the stop 
was almost % of the way down the hill, without any 
traffic whatsoever between plaintiff and the top of the 
hill. Plaintiff did not change traffic lanes. Defendants 
therefore faileq to prove any of the elements of contri-
butory negligence that they alleged. They received the 
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hl'llPl'it of any doubt when the question was put to the 
jury. vV(• havl' no quarrel with the theory that a hand 
~ignal i~ ruquired for a sudden unexpected stop under 
tJw circumstances of Cnited States vs. First Sec. Bank 
of Utah, :20S F.2d -±2-± (lOth cir. 1953); however, there 
u.re ei n·um~tances where brake lights are a sufficient 
~ignal, and may be the only appropriate signal. See Flip-
pen v~. Jl illward, 120 Utah 373, 234 P.2d 1053 (1951). 
llo\\'l'Yl'l', there was no sudden unexpected stop involved 
hnt', and the aforementioned statutes do not apply. The 
issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence was therefore 
properly put before the jury, and the court did not err 
in refusing to give defendants' requested Instruction 
Ko. 7. 
Plaintiff made the proper signal when he made his 
first stop. He also properly looked to his rear to observe 
any vehicles which would have presented an immediate 
hazard, and toward whon1 he owed a duty not to stop. 
The bus ,,·as not there, but came along later. He there-
fore did not violate any statute or ordinance, and as he 
moved slowly forward, he needed no further signal. 
POINT' II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING THE 
JURY AN INSTRUCTION UPON THE THEORY OF LAST 
CLEAR CHANCE. 
The trial court gave the following instruction, at the 
request of the plaintiff: 
INSTRU·CTION NO. 9 
Fnder certain circumstances a plaintiff is en-
titled to a verdict against a defendant even though 
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the plaintiff be guilty of contributory negligence. 
This rule of law that thus permits a negligent 
plaintiff to recover judgment is known as the doc-
trine of last clear chance. If you determine that 
the plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory 
negligence, you should then consider whether 
or not the doctrine of last clear chance is appli-
cable to this case. The doctrine of last clear 
chance is applicable only if you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that each of the fol-
lowing six propositions is true : 
1. That the plaintiff was in a position of danger. 
2. That he was by reason of inattention or lack 
of proper alertness totally unaware of the peril 
that threatened him. 
3. That the defendant actually saw the plaintiff 
and knew of his perilous position. 
4. That the defendant then realized or by the 
exercise of due care should have realized that the 
plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself. 
5. That at the time the defendant saw the plain-
tiff and knew of the peril to him and realized 
or should have realized that the plaintiff was 
oblivious to the danger, he then had a clear op-
portunity to· avoid the accident by the exercise 
of ordinary care and \Vith his then existing ability. 
There must have been an actual opportunity exist-
ing at that moment for the defendant to avoid the 
accident . .Also, it must have been a fair, clear op-
portunity and not just a hare possibility of doing 
so. 
6. That the defendant then negligently failed to 
avail himself of that clear opportunity and as a 
proximate result the plaintiff was injured. 
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lf you find that each of the above six proposi-
tions is true, the doctrine of last clear chance is 
applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is entitled 
to a verdict in his favor even though you find him 
guilty of contributory negligence. If you find that 
any one of the above six propositions is not true, 
the doctrine of last clear chance has no application 
and cannot be invoked by the plaintiff. 
This instruction is quoted verbatim from JIF·U, 
t7.:20, and properly states the law of the state of Utah. 
NPP Compton vs. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; 
Andl'rsen vs. Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co., 117 Utah 197, 
:.n-t P.2d 607 (1959); Morby vs. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 
:2;):2 P.:2d 231 (1953). Whether or not the doctrine of last 
elPar chance applies in a particular case depends entirely 
upon the existence or nonexistence of the elements neces-
~ary to bring it in to play. Such question is controlled by 
factual circumstances and must ordinarily he resolved by 
the fact finder. Daniels vs. City & County of San Fran-
cisco, 40 Cal. 2d 61±, 255 P.2d l785 (1953). It is only when 
the facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the 
~mne conclusions, that -the question presented by them is 
one of law for the court. Sanchez vs. Gomez, 56 N.M. 
~k~~i, :25H P.:2d 3±6 (1953). In determining whether the 
instant case should have been submitted on the plaintiff's 
theory of last clear chance, it is the duty of the court to 
eonsider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Beckstrom vs. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 
P.2d 309 ( 1955). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
It is only when a plaintiff has been guilty of no 
negligence, or if contributory negligence is not alleged 
as an affirmative defense that the doctrine of last clear 
chance has no application. Thomas vs. Sadler, 108 Utah 
552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945). 
In the instant case the questions of contributory 
negligence and last clear chance were submitted to the 
jury. We can assume that they found that plaintiff was 
not guilty of contributory negligence or that he was so 
guilty, and that the defendant had the last clear chance 
to avoid the accident. Assuming therefore, for the pur-
pose of argument, that plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory neg:ligence, it must be determined if the doctrine 
of last clear chance applies. 
The case of Graham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 
P.2d 230 (1946), rehearing denied, 109 Utah 365, 172 P. 
2d 665 (1946), is similar in nature to the instant case. 
In that case the plaintiff (called Gary by the court) and 
other young boys were in the street playing football, 
contrary to a city ordinance. The Defendant (called Dar-
lene by the court) drove on to the street towards the boys, 
but did not sound her horn. 'The plaintiff started to run, 
not knowing the defendant was there, and was hit by 
defedant's car. The court assumed for the purposes of the 
opinions that the plaintiff was in violation of the ordi-
nance prohibiting playing in the street and that the de-
fendant was negligent in failing to sound her horn or to 
stop and allow the boys to become aware of her presence. 
The court said at 166 P .2d 233 : 
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"I ~nt sueh a violation does not permit a driver 
to use the strePt in the same manner as if no per-
son wen· playing games thereon. A duty devolves 
on drivers to drive with care under the circum-
stancPs of the presence of boys in the street." 
.\ pplying that principle to the instant case, if the plain-
t i rr violated a statute by stopping in the street and mov-
ing forward at a slow speed and again stopping without 
a hand signal, this violation did not permit the bus 
driver to use the street in the same manner as if no car 
wt>re stopped there. Being aware of the car in his im-
mediate path, the driver had a duty to drive with care 
under the circumstances, especially on a steep hill with 
a bus load of high school students, knowing that a car 
was in front of him with its taillights flashing on and off. 
Tlw court in Graham vs. Johnson, supra, indicated its 
reliance on sections 479 and 480, Rest~atement of Torts, 
as the rule in this state on last clear chance, and stated: 
Sec. 480 deals with the situation where the 
plaintiff was inattentive but had the ability, had 
he been alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to 
which the defendant was subjecting him. But in 
both cases the liability of the defendant arose be-
cause he failed to take the opportunity which he 
alone had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm 
even though the plaintiff was negligent in getting 
himself in a position where he was helpless or 
because he was so inattentive that he was not alert 
to the approaching danger over which defendant 
had control. And in both cases to hold the defend-
ant liable it must plainly appear to the jury that 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
of plaintiff's helpless peril or of his inattention 
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and after such realization or after he reasonably, 
had he been conducting himself with the vigi-
lance required of him, should have known it, "is 
negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care 
and competence his then existing ability to avoid 
harming the plaintiff." In the clear chance doc-
trine the plaintiff's negligence has become in a 
sense fixed and realizable and on to this state of 
things defendant approaches on to the negligent 
plaintiff with and in control of the danger. 
In situations where reasonable minds must all 
come to the conclusion that a defendant had ample 
opportunity to utilize an existing ability to avoid 
harm to the plaintiff the court should direct a 
verdict for the plaintiff; in situations where 
reasonable minds must all conclude that a defend-
ant did not have such opportunity the verdict 
should be directed for the defendant. In those 
intermediate situations such as the supposition 
under the evidence that Darlene was coming down 
on the far west side of the street where· the court 
is in doubt as to whether all reasonable minds 
could conclude one way or the other he should 
submit the case to the jury with instructions that 
it should be clearly convinced that the defendant 
had a clear chance, viz., ample opportunity or 
clearly an existing ability at the time she reason-
ably should have appreciated the plaintiff's dan-
ger, to avoid harming him; otherwise it should 
find for the defendant. 
The court reversed the case for failure to instruct 
on last clear chance. 
On rehearing, the plaintiff contended that the court 
had misconceived the doctrine of last clear chance. The 
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court dPni!'<l the petition for rehearing, but clarified its 
positioll on la~t clear chance. At 172 P.2d 667, it said: 
The last clear chance duty is to do what a pru-
dent pert)on would have done to avoid the acci-
dent had he had the opportunity, whatever that 
would be, after he did or should have appreciated 
the other's perils or approa~hing peril. 
To revert to the instant case; Darlene was 
cognizant of Gary's inattention and his unaware-
ness that she was .approaching. He was negligent 
in being where he was. She had ample opportunity 
to warn him and put him on attention. To do this 
timely the jury could find was a duty which she 
owed to the plaintiff even in spite of his negli-
gence and due to his situation. The jury could 
find that she omitted to perform her duty. What 
must she anticipate as a natural consequence of 
her omission"? She must anticipate that if she is 
seemingly placing Gary in increasing peril some 
one may be reasonably inspired automatically to 
warn him and that in response to the stimulus of 
that warning, he would or might naturally seek 
safety by running. What might be called the 
automatic chain stems from her omission timely 
to sound a warning. Nothing in this automatic 
chain is an independent superseding cause. The 
situation we are exposing is one where the chain 
of consequences due to failure to do that which the 
clear chance dictates, is automatic or semi-auto-
matic a causation chain as in the well known 
"Squibb" case, stemming from the act of negli-
gence of the defendant which was an omission to 
do what a prudent person would have done to 
avoid the accident when there was a clear oppor-
tunity to do so. That omission may have been 
defendant's only act of negligence but it is on 
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one level and the pliantiff's on another level. 
The plaintiff's negligence was continuing but 
static. The defendant, who was controlling and 
operating the agency of approaching danger, had 
the clear chance to avoid the effect of the other's 
negligence and did not do so. That was her negli-
gence and it came after the plaintiff's negligence 
had become known and fixed. 
The situation in the instant case began to develop 
as the bus driver stopped at 12th East, and saw the Jones 
vehicle stopped in the outside lane of traffic. If it was 
negligent for the plaintiff to be so stopped, or moving 
slowly at that point, then his act of negligence had termi-
nated or become static. Plaintiff was at that point in a 
position of peril. The defendant bus driver saw this situ-
ation from the top of the hill, over 350 feet away, yet he 
moved forward over 400 feet while the plaintiff moved 
only 50 feet, and admitted that plaintiff did not stop 
suddenly-only unexpectedly. At all times from the 
time of the safety stop until the moment before impact, 
the bus driver had a clear opportunity, had he been alert, 
to avoid the accident. He was controlling and operating 
the agency of approaching danger and had the last clear 
chance to avoid its effect. 
In each of the cases defendants cite for the proposi-
tion that last clear chance should not apply in the instant 
case, the fact situation can be clearly distinguished. 
Andersen vs. Bingha.m & Garfield Ry. Co., supra, in-
volved an automobile-train collision, where the train had 
defective brakes. The engineer would have had time to 
stop had the brakes been in good working order. The 
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court held that the instruction on last clear chance was 
not applicable because the engineer did all he could pres-
~·ntly do undt•r the circuinstances to avoid the accident. 
In the instant case there is no evidence of defective 
brakP:s only l'vidence of the fact that the bus driver had 
' . 
a dear chance to avoid the accident, and had the means 
to do so if he had been alert to the developing situation. 
Compton vs. Ogden Onion Ry. & Depot Co., supra, in-
volved a pedestrian who was struck and killed by a rail-
road engine. The court held that the doctrine of last 
elear chance did not apply for 2 reasons: ( 1) that the 
defendant train crew did not know, or have reason to 
know of the perilous situation of the decedent, and (2) 
the decedent, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance, 
could have extricated herself from danger at any time 
before the accident. In the instant case the defendant 
was in fact aware of the danger, and the plaintiff had 
no opportunity to extricate himself from the dangerous 
situation. Cox v. Thompson, supra, involved a pedestrian 
struck and killed by defendant's automobile at night on 
a poorly lighted highway. The court held that the doc-
trine of last clear chance did not apply because the de-
fendant, due to the lighting conditions, and other circum-
stances, did not have a clear chance to avoid the accident. 
Chavroz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P.2d 516 (1961), 
also involved a pedestrian, who was struck and killed by 
defendant's automobile. In that case the accident occur-
red after dark, in a dimly lighted pedestrian lane, and 
the decedent was wearing dark clothing. ·The court ruled 
that the defendent did not in fact have a last clear chance 
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to avoid the accident. In the instant case the accident 
occurred during a clear dry day, while nothing at all 
to obstruct or reduce the vision of the bus driver. He 
did in fact have the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 
Let us then review the facts of the instant case as 
they apply to the six elements of last clear chance. 
1. The plaintiff was in fact in a position of danger, 
being stopped in a lane of traffic. 
2. The reason for his position was his own inatten-
tion or lack of proper allertness. He was totally unaware 
of the peril that threatened him and had no opportunity 
to extricate himself from the danger. 
3. The defendant actually saw the plaintiff, and 
knew of his perilous position, over 400 feet prior to the 
impact. 
4. 1The defendant should have realized that the 
plaintiff was unaware of the danger to himself since he 
had a clear view of the developing situation at all times. 
5. At the time defendant first realized, or should 
have realized that plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, 
he had a clear opportunity to avoid the accident by the 
exercise of ordinary care with his then existing ability. 
He had this opportunity for over 350 feet. 
6. Defendant negligently failed to avail himself of 
that clear opportunity, and as a proximate result, plain-
tiff was injured. This is clearly a fact situation which 
falls within the doctrine of last clear chance, and it 
would have been error not to submit the question to the 
jury. 
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The issues on the contributory negligence of the 
plaintil'l', and the last dear chance of the defendants to 
avoid the accident, were properly submitted to the jury, 
and rP~olvPd in favor of the plaintiff. Respondent there-
t'on• respeetfully sub1nits that the judgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed and that he should have his 
costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. ALLE-N 
Suite 201, 444 S.outh State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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